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ABSTRACT
This paper investigated performance measurement tools and shareholder’s wealth relationships in the context of Malaysian 
public listed construction companies. Conventional measures are still utilized by many Malaysian listed companies even 
though it has been criticized by many researchers. Both traditional accounting measures and economic measures fail to 
reflect a company’s true value due to the lack of long-term sustainability of a business. The study used panel data analysis 
techniques, particularly Error Correction Models (ECM) to test the relationship of error terms and panel Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression to test the hypothesis. Panel data comprised of 280 observations over the period of 2003-2012 
indicates that shareholder value is a function of performance measures. The results conclusively support the claims made 
by previous studies on the role of earnings per share, economic value added (EVA) and dividend payout ratio; and further 
support the potential usefulness of the performance metric for internal and external performance. Furthermore, market 
value added (MVA) is found to have a negative relationship with created shareholder value (CSV) contradicting with the 
theory that confirmed, the increase in shareholder value when there is an increase in stock market value and efficiency.
Keywords: EVA; traditional measures; shareholder’s wealth; dividend policy; Malaysia
INTRODUCTION
In a globalized market, “many companies strive to create 
wealth of shareholders; whereas other companies will 
undoubtedly destroy it” (Grant 2003). For corporate 
managers, wealth creation is fundamental to the economic 
survival of the company. No company will be able to exist 
if it fails to create sufficient wealth for their shareholders 
(Panigrahi et al. 014). In other words, a company that does 
not add value to its wealth will struggle to survive and, 
over a period of time, will be either a subject of takeover or 
liquidation. During the past decades, the linkage between 
performance measurement tools and shareholder’s value 
have been discussed by practitioners and academicians. But 
still it is a debatable concern to the corporate executives 
to identify appropriate performance measurement tool 
that recognizes shareholder value. In the organization, 
non-shareholders are favored at the shareholder’s expenses 
(Brigham & Ehrhardt 2013). 
 The apparent failure of financial statements in 
determining a firm’s true value has drawn the attention 
of research focusing on the broadening gap between a 
firm’s market value and its book value (Othman, Ching 
& Ghazali 2012). Similarly, some studies argued that, 
in reality, traditional accounting measures and economic 
measures have failed to reflect a company’s true value due 
to the lack of long-term sustainability of a business and the 
issue of cost distortion (Lev & Radhakrishnan 2003; Lev & 
Zarowin 1999; Vijayalakshmi 2014). Cost distortion occurs 
when the departments incur different types of overhead 
and the products are used to a different extent. One of 
the key obstacles for shareholders is the identification of 
key performance tools that can help them obtain accurate 
profit information regarding a company. For managers, 
it has been a great challenge to increase their earnings in 
view of the shareholder return as they reflect historical 
performance (Bhunia 2012). According to Kapoor (2011), 
shareholder wealth maximization is the sum of all strategic 
decisions to increase earnings, dividend and market value, 
but there are few studies that have investigated all the 
measures simultaneously. Relevant issues that have not 
been investigated theoretically and empirically include 
the use of earnings explained by traditional measures; 
economic profits explained by economic measures, such 
as EVA and MVA; and dividends that are crucial to strategic 
management decisions. Operationally, EVA is defined as the 
difference between a company’s net operating profit after 
taxes and its cost of capital (Stewart 1991). Furthermore, 
Pruthy and Hara (2014) define MVA as the difference 
between the current market value of a firm and the capital 
contributed by investors. 
 Previous studies investigate EVA and shareholder’s 
return in the form of stock market performance (Sparling & 
Turvey 2003); EVA and its popularity in India (Bhattacharyya 
& Phani 2000); compare EVA and traditional measures in 
Egypt (Omran 2002); EVA and future earnings in United 
Kingdom (A. Ismail 2006); EVA and accounting profits 
in Greek firms (Kyriazis & Anastassis 2007); EVA and 
traditional performance measures in Indian firms (Sharma 
& Kumar 2012); and dividend policy with profitability, 
growth and opportunity in Malaysian firms (Issa 2012). 
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However, none of the aforementioned studies investigate 
the performance measures (i.e., traditional, economic 
and dividend policy) simultaneously as a measurement 
tool for shareholder’s wealth creation. Thus, the present 
study focuses on all the aspects of performance measures 
in relation to shareholder’s wealth, particularly since 
shareholder investment decisions are crucial to avoid risk 
in future investments.
  The key aspects that leads to poor performance 
of Malaysian organizations highlighted by Ab Razak, 
Ahmad and Aliahmed (2008) may be attributed to agency 
problems. Most public listed companies in Malaysia 
still use traditional performance measures that consider 
accounting profits or ratios to measure shareholder return. 
However, Nahar Abdullah (2004) argues that, in Malaysia, 
ratios widely used by companies in order to measure firm 
value may not be able to measure and capture a firm’s 
performance. 
 Furthermore, Al Mamun, Entebang and Mansor 
(2012) note that conventional performance measures 
are criticized due to generally accepted accounting 
principles. Shareholders are suffering from having a 
suitable performance measurement tool that can aid 
investors to assess the investment return (I. Ismail 2011). 
Complementary to this, Vijayalakshmi (2014) mentioned 
that a variety of measures exists that identify shareholder’s 
value, but none of the traditional measures are able to 
explain the changes in shareholder’s wealth. In addition, 
the earnings per share that is considered as company’s 
profit allocation to each outstanding share and also an 
indicator of company’s profitability is criticized as it can 
be manipulated by various approaches like share buyback, 
merger & acquisitions changes in company’s accounting 
policy and so on. The principal objective of the present 
paper is to fill the gap in the literature that was unable 
to provide appropriate measure to create shareholder’s 
wealth. This study will provide an opportunity to advance 
the understanding of the firms’ strategic decisions within 
the aspects of earnings, market value and dividend based 
measures as the benchmark to determine shareholder 
wealth.
INDUSTRY OVERVIEW
Construction firms requires more capital due to its 
significance; complexity; and nature of the work 
performed. However, cost management strategies in the 
construction industry worldwide still remain a chronic 
challenge (Chigara, Moyo & Mudzengerere 2013). Prior to 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Malaysia had experienced 
robust economic growth since the 1980s. The output of 
the Malaysian construction industry grew sharply between 
1991 and 1997; to RM19103 million. During the Asian 
economic crisis, the output of the construction industry 
rapidly decreased to 13887 million (Khan, Liew & Ghazali 
2014). Following the 1998 financial crisis and its protracted 
negative impact, economic growth declined. During the 
1998 financial crisis, construction sector was the one greatly 
affected due to decline in demand. The Oxford Business 
Group (OBG 2008) highlighted a range of issues negatively 
impacting the Malaysian construction industry. The 
construction industry is comprised of companies involved 
in the physical construction of rsidential construction; 
infrastructure; industrial construction; commercial 
construction; and building materials (Chan, Tam & Cheung 
2005). Deep concerns exist that the Malaysian construction 
industry, as a whole, is underachieving in the following 
areas (Alfan & Zakaria 2013):
1. Unstable profitability rate. 
2. Construction companies faces inefficiency due to 
different parties involved in different activities of the 
project. 
3. Factors like savings, ease of maintenance, safety 
and innovative methods of constructs is not highly 
functional. 
4. Unable to control cost related activities.
THEORETICAL BASE
Shareholder wealth creation has been an issue debated in 
literature concerning corporate finance and economics. 
Through the appropriate allocation of resources by 
managers, targets relating to wealth creation can be 
achieved. 
 The neo-classical economic theory known as the 
dominant model (Stormer 2003) indicates the main 
objective of a company is to maximize profits for 
shareholders by creating value. On the other hand, Tisdell 
and Wilson (2012) contend that while the application of 
neo-classical theory as a means to assess the EVA seems to 
be straight forward, it is problematic for several reasons. 
The principal issue is that the neo-classical approach 
assumes that investors are very well informed and possess 
all of the knowledge required for perfect decision making. 
In reality, economic benefits are not captured by neo-
classical evaluation. This was the reason that the neo-
classical theory was extended to the financial instruments 
and markets. 
 According to agency theory, managers or top 
management must act to maximize the value of shareholders 
since they are considered to be the true owners of a firm. 
Shareholders are prioritized after all other stakeholders like 
suppliers, debt holders, government agencies, paying taxes 
and other obligations under state and federal securities 
laws are satisfied (Frankel & Rose 1996). Thus, agency 
theory for shareholder value is still questionable. Agency 
theory links shareholder value with managerial incentives 
to avoid conflicts (Roth & O’Donnell 1996).
 Freeman (1984) put forward stakeholder theory with 
the perspective of strategic management and has been 
adopted by many organizations as a part of management 
tool. However, the main weaknesses of stakeholder 
theory is that it does not focus on shareholder wealth 
maximization only is bound to serve all the stakeholders 
in a corporation; and is criticized due to its vagueness and 
ambiguity. Managers must favor the decisions towards 
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all the stakeholders engaged in the company. Firm 
value cannot be maximized by ignoring the value of 
shareholders (Jensen 2001). From the critical review, 
it was found that agency theory and stakeholder theory 
were facing critiques that made this research to reconcile 
the originality of agency theory and stakeholder theory 
favoring the shareholder wealth maximization. 
 The efficiency of EVA is also criticized in extant 
studies (Biddle, Bowen & Wallace 1997; Chen & Dodd 
1997; Fernandez 2002; Tortella & Brusco 2003). EVA 
has been criticized as it does not analyze stock market 
reaction by the firms. EVA has also been criticized due to 
the lack of adoption of EVA by the corporations However, 
after examining the EVA data provided by Stern Stewart & 
Co (a management consultant firm), Biddle et al. (1997) 
found that operating cash flow performs better than EVA 
for the shareholder wealth. In response to the claims by 
Biddle et al. (1997), recent literatures like (Gupta et al. 
2016 & Nakhaei et al. 2016) determined whether EVA as 
measurement tool be able to create shareholder’s wealth? 
After analyzing extant literature (Alipour & Pejman 2015; 
Awan, Siddique & Sarwar 2014; Fayed & Dubey 2016; 
Liljeblom & Maury 2016) concerning EVA, it became 
evident that the studies obtained mixed results for the 
role of EVA on true wealth creation of shareholders. From 
such mixed results, there can be a theoretical argument on 
the properties of EVA. Many extant studies like (Chetty, 
Friedman & Rockoff 2014; Salehi, Enayati & Javadi 
2014) examined the characteristics of EVA, but they also 
question its utility towards shareholders value. Thus, a 
research gap continues to exist in regards to identifying a 
true wealth creation measurement tool for shareholders. 
Thus, the main objective of this study is to identify the 
main performance measurement tool that is able to create 
shareholder’s value. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
The creation of shareholder value is one of the most 
important goals of an organization (Grant 2016). The 
importance of company valuation has increased over the 
past few decades (Fernandes 2015). Stakeholders are 
the group of people who are affected by or can affect an 
organization’s activities. Equally important, Sundaram 
and Inkpen (2004) state that organization is unable to 
survive with unethical involvement of the stakeholders. 
Managers must execute decisions in the interest of 
shareholders (Freeman, Wicks & Parmar 2004). Thus, 
accurate information becomes obvious for the managers 
for determining company’s future direction and valuation 
of business. 
TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTING MEASURES
For years, managers have used traditional methods to 
measure financial performance, such as return on assets 
(ROA); return on equity (ROE); earnings per share (EPS); 
and net income. The heart of the issue concerning the use 
of accounting measures is whether a company’s financial 
statements actually measure the economic value of the 
firm (Carton 2006). According to neo-classical economists, 
profit maximization is considered the legitimate objective 
of all private organizations. In addition, Carton (2006) 
states that “To maximize shareholder wealth, management 
must generate, evaluate and select business strategies that 
will increase the value of the company” (p.37). However, 
Chakravarthy (1986) concluded that traditional profitability 
measures are inadequate for evaluating a firm’s strategic 
importance. Despite critics, Verweir (2006) claims that 
traditional financial performance measures continue to 
play an important role in the corporate world. Ohlson and 
Juettner-Nauroth (2005) highlighted the role of EPS and its 
role in security valuation. Collins, Pincus, and Xie (1999) 
discuss the effect of negative earnings on equity valuation. 
Furthermore, Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (1999); Kasznik 
and McNichols (2002) stated that meeting the current 
earnings expectations reflects the market premium and 
rewards for the managers. 
 ROA is calculated as “operating profit divided by 
total assets” (Maury & Pajuste 2005:1814). ROA is used 
in many studies to measure firm performance (Andres 
2008; Isik & Soykan 2013). However, when it comes to 
investigate the relationship between ROA and shareholder 
wealth maximization, there are mixed opinions among 
academicians and researchers. ROA, in the long term, not 
able to create value for shareholders due to a great degree 
of manipulation of the historical aspects of performance 
by managers (Benston 1982; Bergstresser, Desai & Rauh 
2006; Coe 1981; Watts & Zimmerman 1990). In addition, 
Isik and Soykan (2013) find that large shareholders have 
a significant effect on the performance of a firm measured 
by ROA.
 ROE is defined as “the return obtained on the book 
value of a company’s shares” (Khan & Zuberi 1999, p.15). 
Essentially, ROE is a measure of the return that a company’s 
management is able to earn on the money invested to it by 
its shareholders. In simple terms, ROE measures the return 
generated by the management for each invested dollar. ROE 
is not a good indicator for shareholder’s wealth in both 
finance and accounting studies (Athanasoglou, Brissimis, 
& Delis 2008). For instance, Chen and Dhiensiri (2009) 
investigated three performance measures (i.e. ROE, ROA 
and market to book ratio) and found that the traditional 
measures are not significant measures. In addition, Magni 
(2010) examined ROE and its relationships with net present 
value (NPV) and MVA found that shareholder wealth is 
signaled from ROE. However, Kabajeh, Al-Nu’aimat and 
Dahmash (2012) examined the influence of ROA, ROE and 
return on investment (ROI) ratios on the share price and 
found no significant relationship between them. 
 Return on capital employed (ROCE) functions use 
two items (i.e., profits and capital employed). ROCE is 
calculated as “the ratio of operating profit with capital 
employed” (Khan & Zuberi 1999: 16). By using other 
sources of finance, management is able to increase the 
capital employed in the business. The effective use of this 
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enlarged capital base can be measured by comparing profits 
before interest charges to total capital employed (Coles 
1997; Brigham & Houston 2011). ROCE is a traditional 
approach to investment appraisal that is known by different 
names and determined by a variety of computational 
methods. 
 Dividend policy due to its advantage of providing 
asymmetric information to managers and shareholders 
have been widely accepted as shareholder wealth creation 
(Panigrahi & Zainuddin 2015). Miller and Modigliani 
(1961) opined that “the effect of a firm’s dividend policy 
on the current price of its shares is a matter of considerable 
importance” (p.412). Similarly, (Kapoor 2011) investigates 
the relationship between dividend policy and shareholder 
value and finds a negative association between the 
variables. The conclusion reached by Kapoor (2011) is 
that when shareholders receive dividend, it reduces firm’s 
retained earnings. 
 Net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) is the first step 
in calculating EVA. NOPAT is the profit that remains after 
deducting all operating expenses, such as depreciation and 
cash taxes, but excludes interest on loans. NOPAT helps to 
find economic profit through a series of adjustments. In 
the underlying business process, NOPAT is considered as an 
important performance tool as it excludes excessive debts 
and the tax benefits associated with such debts. In order 
to get better results when using NOPAT as a performance 
measure, it is very important to compare values within the 
same industrial sector. NOPAT is very useful for the merger 
and acquisition process of a company, as acquisition can 
replace the debt arrangements of a company. According 
to Stewart (1991) in order to calculate NOPAT there have 
been made adjustments in the accounting profits of some 
companies. While calculating NOPAT, tax charge is adjusted 
since it includes the tax benefits of debts. Tax benefits are 
removed from the tax charge. Thus, to calculate NOPAT, 
profit after tax is determined first, then the net cost of 
interest is added to the tax charge using interest charge 
multiplied by (1 - corporate tax rate). 
 In order to calculate NOPAT, three basic steps need to 
be followed:
1. Start with earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)
2.  Making key accounting adjustments like accounting 
distortion
3.  Subtract cash operating taxes
 NOPAT is defined as “net operating profit remaining 
in the business after tax payments and before interest” 
(Bacidone, Boquist, Milbourn & Thakor 997. p.15). 
Accounting profits are turned into economic profits by 
adjusting the net operating income. The adjustment of 
NOPAT depends on the GAAP procedures of the country. 
ECONOMIC VALUE BASED MEASURES
The primary aim of management is to increase the value of 
shareholders. Economic value added (EVA) is the economic 
value based measure that calculates shareholder wealth 
and is widely used by management for making decisions 
and increasing productivity; new capital investment; and as 
a guide for liquidating underperforming assets. According 
to Stewart (1991), EVA is a performance measurement tool 
reflecting the absolute amount of shareholder wealth creation 
through an effective investment decision. EVA is different 
from other traditional performance measures because it 
completely accounts for the firm’s overall capital costs 
(Hiang Liow & Ooi 2004). The reason for emphasizing EVA 
as a value based measure is for increasing shareholder’s 
wealth (Tong, Yao & Xiong 2010). Conventional accounting 
claims that majority of the firms generate profit, but are 
unable to create shareholder value. 
 For performance evaluation, it is important to encourage 
both managers and employees to work cooperatively 
together with the goal of increasing shareholder confidence. 
Furthermore, Tebogo (2011) mentioned that when companies 
work towards interest of the shareholders, it increases their 
confidence level. EVA calculation is criticized due to its 
numerous adjustments to profit and capital employed figures 
(Shil 2009). Thus, it can be said that mixed results have 
been obtained concerning the relationship between EVA and 
shareholder wealth creation in extant studies.
 Market value added (MVA) refers to the market value 
of the firm and capital invested by the shareholders. MVA 
deducts the value of equity, loans and retained earnings 
from the market value of share capital and debt. MVA is 
similar to a book to market ratio, but the difference is that 
MVA is an absolute measure whereas market to book ratio 
is a relative measure. From MVA calculations, the value 
added by a company to shareholder investments can be 
achieved. Furthermore, de Wet (2005) mentioned that 
MVA is the best performance measure because it indicates 
market assessment. MVA is not a performance metric like 
EVA, but is a wealth metric that measures the level of value 
a company has accumulated over time (Dierickx & Cool 
1989). Therefore, it is important to investigate MVA since 
performance metrics explain shareholder value. 
HYPOTHESIS STATEMENTS
The following alternative hypotheses are formed based on 
an extent review of theoretical and empirical studies; and 
the overall research objective:
H1.  Earnings per shares (EPS) is an important performance 
measure for creating shareholder’s wealth. 
H2.  Return on assets (ROA) is an important performance 
measure for creating shareholder’s wealth. 
H3.  Return on equity (ROE) is an important performance 
measure for creating shareholder’s wealth. 
H4.  Return on capital employed (ROCE) is an important 
performance measure for creating shareholder’s 
wealth. 
H5:  Net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) is an important 
performance measure for creating shareholder’s 
wealth.
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H5. Dividend payout ratio (DPR) is an important 
performance measure for creating shareholder’s 
wealth. 
H6. Economic value added (EVA) is an important 
performance measure for creating shareholder’s 
wealth. 
H7. Market value added (MVA) is an important performance 
measure for creating shareholder’s wealth. 
METHODOLOGY
The data set for the present study is comprised of the 
annual reports of 43 Malaysian construction companies and 
Thomson Reuters Financial Database for the Malaysian 
market, which includes ten annual observations, from 2003 
to 2012. Several construction firms from the sample were 
omitted because their shares were not publicly traded for 
the whole of the ten-year period. The sample is reduced 
further due to a lack of some accounting data in the 
database utilized for the present study. After accounting for 
missing data items and calculating the variables, the final 
sample size is comprised of 280 firm year observations. 
The panel data analysis was performed by using EVIEWS 
8.0 software. 
REGRESSION MODEL
The panel data regression model utilized in this study is 
as follows:
 CSVit =  βi + β1EPSit + β2ROAit + β3ROEit + 
β4ROCEit + β5NOPATit + β6DPRit + 
   β7EVAit + β8MVAit + + αi + μit + eit (1)
Where: 
i and t denote the company and time period; β is the 
intercept term; and β1 to β8 are the coefficients of 
independent variables. The variable αi presents the 
unobserved factors. μit is a time varying error term that 
includes unobserved factors that change over time and 
affect shareholder value. eit is the error term. 
DATA RESULTS
TEST FOR HETEROSCEDASTICITY
Heteroscedasticity is used to know the variation in the 
accuracy of prediction across data groups in the value-
added literature (Herrmann, Walsh, Isenberg & Resch 
2013). Under certain assumptions, the OLS estimators under 
heteroscedasticity have normally distributed and centered 
data, but, due to maximum likelihood estimation, it is 
obvious to check the data for heteroscedasticity issues. If 
the estimation of shareholder value is desired, then the issue 
of omitted variable bias and unobserved heteroscedasticity 
are confronted. The OLS estimator is more reliable and 
consistent; and the usual standard error is valid. Thus, in 
the presence of heteroscedasticity, the result must make 
the standard error robust (Wooldridge 2003).
 The diagnostic test identifies five different potential 
sources, each suggesting group wise difference in 
error variance with a group defining the dependent 
variable CSV and other groups defined according to the 
independent variables. The White Test is utilized to test the 
heteroscedasticity issue and is regressed upon the residuals 
to test if the regressors can explain the residuals. 
 The residual graph provided in Figure 1 indicates 
that the residuals follow the same path of the actual 
and fitted path. This signals a residual error, leading to 
heteroscedasticity. 
TABLE 1. Variables and its calculations
Variables Calculation of the variable
Earnings per Share
Return on Equity
Return on Assets Net income / Total Assets
Return on capital employed Operating Profit / Capital Employed
Dividend Payout Ratio
Economic Value Added NOPAT – (Capital Invested × Weighted Average Cost of Capital)
Net Operating Profit after Tax PBIT (nnrt) × (1 – T)
Market Value Added Common outstanding shares × Share price – Equity book value
Created Shareholder Value EMV × (SR – Ke)
Note: PBIT (nnrt) = Profit before interest and Taxes (net of non-recurring transactions); T = Tax; EMV = Equity Market Value, calculated 
as (share price x number of shares); SR = Shareholder return, calculated as (Capital gain +Dividends); Ke is calculated as cost of equity 
calculated using a capital asset pricing model. 
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 According to the guideline provided by research 
scholars like (Rice 1989; Greenland et al. 2016; Rindskopf 
2016), if the p-value is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is 
rejected. Here, the p-value was found to be less than 0.05 
and, thus, the null hypothesis is rejected. In econometrics, 
White test is the most common test for heteroscedasticity 
to detect the variance of the errors (Cerasa, Torti & 
Perrotta 2016). In other words, the results indicate the 
presence of heteroscedasticity, which is not desirable. 
The model applies robust standard errors throughout for 
correcting heteroscedasticity issues as suggested by (White 
1980). According to White (1980) in order to deal with 
the removal of heteroscedasticity, the variables must be 
modified to the logarithm, but this data consists of zero or 
negative values that limited the study to use this concept 
of removal. Thus, the standard error test was performed 
where the co-variance matrix was adjusted to white and the 
cross terms were excluded in order to perform a residual 
diagnostic test (Brooks 2014). Thus, based on the residual 
tests, it can be concluded that heteroscedasticity issues can 
be found in cross-sectional or panel data and not only in 
the time series data (Islam 1995).
UNIT ROOT TESTS
Cross sectional data in the panel data analysis requires 
to be stationary. Panel data significance is achieved 
through the statistical confirmation of constant covariance, 
variance and mean (Levin, Lin & Chu 2002; Choi 2001). 
Therefore, it is important to consider whether or not the 
FIGURE 1. Actual, fitted residual graph
TABLE 2. Heteroscedasticity test: White
F-statistic
Obs*R-squared
Scaled explained SS
33.15988
138.5065
1436.147
 Prob. F(8,271)
 Prob. Chi-Square(8)
 Prob. Chi-Square(8)
0.000
0.000
0.000
White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C
EPS^2
ROA^2
ROE^2
ROCE^2
NOPAT^2
EVA^2
DPR^2
MVA^2
-5.48E+12
2.88E+09
-7.14E+08
-1.92E+08
8.87E+08
731.4203
-1304.32
1.95E+09
0.000204
8.43E+12
3.93E+09
1.33E+09
2.04E+08
6.75E+08
869.4983
4178.313
8.55E+08
0.000112
-0.65025
0.73344
-0.53823
-0.94145
1.31501
0.8412
-0.31216
2.2752
1.82314
0.516
0.464
0.591
0.347
0.190
0.401
0.755
0.024
0.069
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
0.494666
0.479748
1.64E+14
7.25E+30
-9556.544
33.15988
0.000
    Mean dependent var
    S.D. dependent var
    Akaike info criterion
    Schwarz criterion
    Hannan-Quinn criter.
    Durbin-Watson stat
4.81E+13
2.27E+14
68.32531
68.44215
68.37218
1.81032
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data are stationary prior to estimating the relationship 
between the economic growth and its determinants. 
Equally important, Phillips and Perron (1988) and Wu 
(2000) stated that conducting regressions which employ 
non-stationary variables may lead to misleading results, 
showing apparently significant relationships where the 
variables are generated independently. 
 In addition, Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) stated that, 
empirical researchers have shown interest in the panel data 
analysis. It is crucial for the study to control the spurious 
regression due to the non-parametric characteristics. The 
unit root test for the variables must be significant and the 
t-statistics must be above the threshold value of ±1.96, 
confirming the null hypothesis that the data is stationary 
(Oh 1996). The unit root threshold value for all the variables 
were above ±1.96 (see. Table 3). Thus the variables are 
stationary and are confirmed to be non-parametric. 
ERROR CORRECTION MODEL
Error correction model describe the long run equilibrium 
between the variables. If the co-integration among the 
variables is confirmed, it shows the existence of error 
correction model in short run to equilibrium (Engle 
& Granger 1987). ECM also helps to test the causation 
between the constructs (Brooks 2008). In addition, “the 
t-statistics of the coefficients of the lagged error correction 
term ECTt-1 should indicate the significance of long-run 
causality between the two variables” (Maghyereh 2001 p. 
136). The statistical significance of the t-statistics in tests 
should be at most 5%. 
 The error correction estimation presented in Table 
4 above reveals that this error correction term or speed 
of adjustment coefficient is correctly signed with the 
negative Error Correction Term (U (-1)). The negative 
error correction term implies that any error generated in 
each period has a tendency to explode or wander further 
towards the equilibrium path over the time following 
disequilibrium in each period. The value of (U(-1))accounts 
for the correction of only 58 per cent of the error generated 
in the last period and, from the value of the t-statistic, the 
error term’s coefficient is statistically significant. The 
statistical significance of both the error-correction terms 
and the lag dynamics terms, as mentioned in Table.4e, 
implies that the short-term changes found in the level 
of shareholder’s wealth are somewhat tied to the future 
changes in performance measures. Therefore in each 
short-term period, shareholder’s wealth is adjusted by 
taking into account the difference between the indicators 
of performance measures in the previous time period.
OLS REGRESSION MODEL
The results of the wealth creation models from different 
perspectives is performed after conducting data validation 
using the unit root test and residual diagnostics analysis; 
and identifying the degree of validation and acceptance 
of data. 
 The OLS regression using panel data of created 
shareholder’s value on the independent variables (EVA, 
MVA, DPS, EPS, ROA, ROE, ROCE and NOPAT) is addressed 
in Table 5. Additionally, fixed effect and random effect 
model is used in the pool regression model (Worthington 
and West 2004). From the empirical results, the R2 for 
the fixed effect models is higher as compared to the 
random common effects. Furthermore, Hausman test 
is used as panel data analysis to select the appropriate 
model to estimate the regression analysis (Mojtahedi and 
Boka 2013). Similarly, Sharma and Kumar (2012) and 
Panigrahi, Zainuddin and Azizan (2014), found that the 
random effect is more appropriate to compare EVA and 
traditional measures. 
 The random effect panel regression analysis confirms 
EPS as a traditional measure; EVA as an economic value 
based measure; and DPR has a high impact on CSV. The 
combination of all three components as a performance 
measurement tool is able to explain shareholder value. 
For shareholders, EPS is important because it reveals 
information about the financial health of a company. 
Increasing EPS is a very good sign for an organization 
(Chatfield & Dalbor 2005). In regard to the investors, it 
can be claimed that as the earnings per share get bigger, 
TABLE 3. Results of panel unit root test
 
Variables
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Philips-Perror Fisher
ADF (0) ADF (1) P-P (0) P-P (1)
CSV
EPS
ROA
ROE
ROCE
NOPAT
EVA
DPR
MVA
-5.1531
-12.5125
-15.0057
-17.339
-16.0159
-8.3233
-11.2923
-15.7944
-4.8325
-9.9899
-11.781
-12.1586
-10.8024
-13.857
-12.2537
-11.4068
-10.6576
-16.3232
-6.4398
-12.56098
-15.0095
-17.7244
-16.00238
-8.5066
-11.3554
-15.799
-5.9984
-23.6997
-172.102
-246.134
-139.152
-130.138
-37.365
-77.843
-113.96
-16.505
Note: t-statistics threshold value is ± 1.96
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the value of shareholders rises as well. Similarly, when 
the economic value of a stock is increased, the shareholder 
value also increases. Furthermore, firms paying dividends 
generate positive signals towards the future investment 
expectations of shareholders. The result is congruent with 
the expectations of stakeholder theory.
 Contrary to the findings of other studies (Chen & 
Qiao 2008; Phani & Bhattacharyya 2000; Vijayalakshmi 
2014), this research found that EVA creates shareholder 
wealth and focuses more on economic profit rather than 
bookkeeping profits. Thus, the EVA findings in this study 
are obvious and justified in relation to explaining and 
predicting stock prices and its valuations. 
 The final variable found to be positively significant 
is dividend payout ratio. According to Abdullah, Razazila, 
Ismail, Sadique and Bi (2005); Amidu and Abor (2006); 
Rehman and Takumi, (2012) and Zakaria, Muhammad and 
Zulkifli (2012), dividend payout matters for shareholders, 
as well as companies, in order to communicate financial 
well-being and sending a clear and powerful message about 
future prospects and performance. 
 Furthermore, most empirical studies reported that MVA 
has a positive effect on determining the created shareholder 
value. On the contrary, the tests performed in this study 
indicate a significant, but negative, relationship between 
MVA and CSV. The negative relationship between MVA 
TABLE 5. Cross-section random effect OLS model
Dependent Variable: CSV
Sample: 2003 2012
Total panel (balanced) observations: 280
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C
EPS
EVA
DPR
MVA
ROA
ROE
ROCE
NOPAT
3269493
133003.8
33.72617
27160.79
-0.030237
20766.53
3228.937
10112.31
-57.05581
559103.2
27057.54
16.76371
9583.069
0.001908
38744.02
16687.32
15351.78
6.331977
5.847745
4.915592
2.011856
2.834248
-15.84601
0.535993
0.193496
0.658706
-9.010743
0.000
0.000
0.045
0.005
0.000
0.592
0.847
0.511
0.000
Weighted Statistics
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
0.835988
0.831146
7049270
172.6645
0.000
 Mean dependent var
  S.D. dependent var
  Sum squared resid
  Durbin-Watson stat 
 -4957563
17154915
1.35E+16
1.187303
TABLE 4. The error correction model: CSV as dependent variable
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C
D(EPS)
D(ROA)
D(ROE)
D(ROCE)
D(NOPAT)
D(EVA)
D(DPR)
D(MVA)
U(-1)
-17671.02
138891.5
15803.28
-6522.125
-9057.761
-40.05568
-2.024771
24876.28
-0.033866
-0.582629
382136.1
23050.23
27867.44
10999.08
11103.24
6.517373
13.13631
6800.991
0.002756
0.060366
-0.046243
6.025603
0.567087
-0.59297
-0.815777
-6.145986
-0.154135
3.657743
-12.28782
-9.651581
0.963
0.000
0.571
0.554
0.415
0.000
0.878
0.000
0.000
0.000
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
0.744913
0.736379
6382856
1.10E+16
-4762.478
87.28268
0.000
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat
 
 
-2899.649
12431542
34.21131
34.34146
34.26352
1.864441
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and CSV supports neo-classical theory, which suggests 
that value maximization and market efficiency fail to 
provide an explanation of crucial aspects of organizational 
development, such as technological progress and economic 
benefit. The neo-classical model also predicts that if the 
investment is sensitive to current financial performance, 
this is a sign that something is wrong and is to be regarded 
as a problem for corporate policy. 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This study investigated the relationship between 
performance measures and shareholder’s wealth creation. 
It is an important study in the context of shareholder 
insight about their value for the investment made by them. 
The study found highly significant positive relationship 
between EPS, EVA, and DPR, as value-based measurement 
tools; and shareholder wealth creation. The findings of 
the panel regression analysis showed that the stakeholder 
theory hypothesis is valid for Malaysian public listed 
construction companies since economic value is created 
when the earnings of an organization are greater than the 
cost of operation and generating capital. In consequence, 
it can be said that increasing the economic value of shares 
and firm leads to increases in shareholder value. These 
findings are very meaningful for the shareholders and 
policy makers in the organization. This study provides 
important information for the managers in designing 
shareholder related policies for uplifting their morale and 
be committed to their organization. 
 A major policy implication from the results stems 
from the fact that a positive relationship exists between 
EPS, EVA and DPR towards CSV. To tap into the value 
generating capacity of these performance measures, it 
is essential to adopt measures favorable for shareholder 
wealth maximization. Using the economic model, it only 
matters where the cash outlay is recorded when it affects 
taxes. Companies must conduct corporate valuation 
periodically not only to select an effective strategy, 
but also to determine its shareholder’s value. By using 
the EVA model, managers and practitioners are able to 
pay more attention to operations by understanding the 
relationship between changes in price and receivable 
or payable days. Thus, by using EPS, EVA and DPR as 
performance measurement tools, managers can ensure 
that the decisions made create value. The success of a 
firm is dependent on its ownership structure and, thus, 
incentives must be provided based on the performance 
of each business unit. Managers must be encouraged to 
be more aggressive in meeting their short and long term 
goals, along with their commitment to continuously create 
value.
 It is highly recommended that researchers expand 
upon the present study by extending the data sampling 
period. Additionally, firm level analysis into the 
relationship between performance measures and 
shareholder wealth would be desirable to supplement the 
findings of this research. Future studies should include 
factors relating to financial and non-financial metrics, 
such as customer loyalty; research and development; 
firm size; employee satisfaction; and technology and 
productivity measures, including strategic management 
and operational management. 
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